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Abstract: 
During escalating Pacific crises, the former journalist and Australian Prime Minister John 
Curtin confided war secrets to a select circle of reporters to elicit media support for his 
leadership in World War II. Although his briefings appeared astonishingly indiscreet, there 
are research gaps on how Curtin selectively developed journalistic techniques, including off-
the-record talks and news leaks, to influence the media portrayal of Australia’s role in the 
Pacific war. This paper uses secret wartime diaries, confidential cables and unscreened 
newsreels to reveal Curtin’s ability to win press support for his controversial decision to bring 
home the nation’s troops from Burma battles in 1942. He expanded the political 
correspondents’ roles as instruments of public diplomacy to sway Allied public opinion 
towards supporting Australian defence. While he benefited from censorship, he legitimised 
the use of candid press relations that opened more opportunities for the growth of 
investigative reporting of Australia’s involvement in war. 
 
Introduction: 
As the Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin had been a journalist who used his background 
in the news to develop astonishingly candid talks with reporters during World War II. Curtin 
used his unprecedented off-the-record talks to win media support for his controversial 
decisions to bring back Australian troops from faraway battles for home defence. Previously, 
the Australian prime minister had cultivated relatively formal and distant media relations. For 
example, the Melbourne Herald correspondent Joseph Alexander lamented that the past 
prime ministers’ conferences had been “like angel’s visits, few and far between.”.1 Although 
Curtin’s briefings appeared astonishingly indiscreet, there are research gaps on how he 
selectively developed journalistic techniques, including off-the-record talks and news leaks, 
to influence the media portrayal of Australia’s role in the Pacific war.2 
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His sharing of war secrets allowed a small circle of senior political journalists to gain deeper 
insights into the Allies’ disagreements over whether Australia needed stronger defence 
against enemy attacks. The seemingly candid, egalitarian talks encouraged the journalists to 
view themselves as a crucial part of his governance. He shared top-secret war cables with this 
select group of reporters during his twice-daily briefings. In his blue, upholstered prime 
minister’s office, he appeared to lean back casually on his swivel chair as if he were thinking 
out loud with the journalists.
3
 Curtin had been a labour-oriented newspaper editor, and he 
indicated to the reporters that he trusted them to give their opinions and advice at the 
conferences. Alexander recalled, “At one stroke, Curtin created a two-way pipeline of 
information which he regarded as of vital importance in the conduct of the war.”4 Whereas 
Curtin benefited from censorship, he distanced himself from appearing to suppress 
journalists’ stories by delegating this task to the government bureaucrats.5 This paper 
provides a rare analysis of Curtin’s press, broadcast and film techniques that influenced 
journalists’ enthusiastic withholding of secrets and legitimised his Pacific war strategies in 
the news. A study of his techniques indicates the democratic possibilities of using expanded 
communication spaces for greater critical enquiries into war and governance. 
 
Literature review: 
There has been a lack of published research on Curtin’s ability to persuade more journalists 
to back the escalated American troop deployment in Queensland’s capital city, Brisbane, 
which became US General Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters in the South-West Pacific. 
Scholars and biographers have commented that Curtin benefited from his media background 
to establish mainly positive relations with journalists during the war. The son of a struggling 
police constable in the gold mining town of Creswick, Victoria, Curtin had been a trade union 
newspaper editor. Later, he became the Australia Journalists’ Association district president in 
Western Australia.
6
 During his Australian Labor Party (ALP) prime ministership from 
October 7, 1941 to July 5, 1945, he generally held twice-daily media briefings that included 
off-the-record talks.
7
 He became Australia’s first prime minister to appoint a full-time press 
secretary, who aided his communications to journalists.
8
 This paper contributes to the 
scholarly research on government-media relations by revealing how Curtin used persuasive, 
performative media tactics to encourage journalists to reproduce his war views to public 
audiences. 
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Likewise, there is a gap in the research on how Curtin used radio and filmed broadcasts to 
appear to have developed relations of direct democracy and trust with news audiences. The 
medium of political newsreel reports was relatively new in wartime Australia, despite the 
limited filming decades earlier with a cinema advertisement of Prime Minister Stanley Bruce 
in the mid-1920s.
9
 Whereas authors have focused on television’s “lowering effect”, making a 
political leader appear to be in an equal relationship with the media audiences,
10
 few scholars 
have examined Curtin’s techniques to appear in an “everyman” framework for the public.11 
Radio was still developing in Australia and previous prime ministers generally did not adapt 
long, complicated speeches to the broadcast medium for public audiences.
12
 Scholarly works 
have discussed how the national leader’s radio and film messages generated sympathetic 
public responses, but these have not shown how news teams cooperated with Curtin to mask 
governmental conflicts behind the scenes.
13
 This study helps to fill gaps in the research of 
Curtin’s use of film symbolism, media events and rhetoric to articulate persuasive power and 
secure journalists’ endorsement of his war strategies. 
 
Multimethod approaches 
To gain insights into Curtin’s use of the media during the South-West Pacific conflict, this 
study is informed by Manuel Castells’ analysis of power and the views of journalism of 
Richard V. Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B.L. Chan.
14
 Following Ericson et al’s 
ideas, this analysis considers that the wartime correspondents mainly operated as government 
“information brokers” and “knowledge linkers” with the public because they were engaged in 
“reproducing the knowledge of their sources.”15 Applying this concept, the paper shows that 
journalists often cooperated with Curtin to visualise and define threats to Australia, 
principally in the form of Axis aggression, as a social deviation from moral and ethical 
principles of fairness, justice and decency. According to Castells, communication and 
information are fundamental sources of power.
16
 In Castells’ view, media politics has led to 
the “personalization of politics” around leaders, who create symbolic messages of trust about 
themselves that will obtain citizens’ support. The political messages “must be couched in the 
specific language of the media” if these are to be communicated successfully to citizens. This 
study analyses Curtin’s multimedia messages to ascertain how he appeared to be the 
“symbolic embodiment of trust”, making his governance seem more transparent and 
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responsive when communicating his resolve to defend Australia and the South-West 
Pacific.
17
 
 
Furthermore, this article uses a dramaturgy approach to explore the more stylized aspects of 
Curtin’s political tactics to create symbolic messages of trust. By communicating about 
policies in clear, appealing terms through the popular entertainment settings of the era, a 
leader can secure the spectators’ collective participation in an event and satisfy the public 
desire for the liberating function of free speaking.
18
 This study of Curtin’s use of newsreels 
reveals his rehearsed rhetoric, practiced gestures and camera techniques to seemingly reduce 
the traditional divide between the national leader and public audiences.
19
 From a sample of 
screened and unissued newsreels, an analysis is made of the camera angles, shots and signs, 
or meaning, based on Arthur Asa Berger’s semiotic film conventions.20 This analysis reveals 
how he collaborated with news teams to portray the semblance of a close, active relationship 
between him and public audiences that disguised Allied disagreements revealed in private 
correspondence.
21
 
 
Moreover, this paper includes an analysis of relevant rhetoric to find out how Curtin made his 
Pacific war messages to seem appealing, relatable and open to public audiences. A leader’s 
use of a formal speaking style indicates a distancing from the working classes and desire to 
keep them at arm’s length.22 Thus an examination is made of the selection of words and 
reading ease of Curtin’s radio talks to determine his efforts to engage more citizens. To 
evaluate whether he delivered messages in “the specific language of the media”, this article 
examines his broadcast scripts’ readability.23 An analysis has been made of four of his major 
war broadcasts.
24
 This study’s readability measurement includes the Flesch-Kincaid score; 
the recommendation is for a score of eight, close to the reading level of “middle-brow” 
newspapers and suitable for an eighth-grade reading level.
25
 Public opinion polling had begun 
in 1941 in Australia and was still developing in the US because this did not include 
sophisticated methods to measure media audiences. To discover the impact of Curtin’s media 
messages, this study ascertains whether journalists reproduced his statements favourably in 
the news.
26
 This analysis is based on the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in 
Journalism formula that a news article is deemed “positive” if two-thirds of the statements 
appear to support a leader.
27
 By applying these methods and conceptual approaches, this 
article will identify how journalists cooperated with Curtin to generate positive news 
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coverage about his Pacific war views, as well as media messages that would appear 
accessible and persuasive to democratic audiences. 
 
Findings and discussion 
Curtin’s off-the-record talks and information leaks became a vital diplomatic tool in the 
Allies’ controversy over Burma in 1942. Through top-secret cables, he was defying both the 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt by 
turning back Australian troops from Burma for home defence.
 28
 During confidential news 
briefings, journalists agreed with him that Australia needed stronger military defence and 
they volunteered to self-censor his dispute with Churchill and Roosevelt, who asserted that 
the nation was not in danger of an enemy invasion.
29
 Newsreels revealed gaps and omissions 
in the early reporting of Curtin’s dispute with the Allies in February 1942. Reporters 
carefully masked the tensions among the Allied leaders, when the Axis enemies still held the 
advantage. For example, a British Movietone newsreel reporter neglected to mention Curtin’s 
disagreements with Churchill when broadcasting the Australian prime minister’s speech. The 
newsreel reporter also did not mention Curtin’s health concerns when he gave his talk at 
Sydney’s Martin Place. Instead, the film narrator, Leslie Mitchell, portrayed this to be a 
spontaneous news report as he seemingly confided to mass audiences: “As we know, he is not 
in the habit of beating about the bush and his impromptu remarks on this occasion were 
typically frank.” In fact, Curtin was attempting to hide his stomach problem by confidently 
hooking his thumb into his waistcoat pocket when he stood on a podium to project the image 
of a strong leader.
30
 Unscreened footage revealed his meticulous rehearsing to deliver 
forceful language and gestures.
31
 Even so, he was taken to a Sydney hospital some 45 
minutes after his filmed speech. Journalists played down the news of his health problems as 
they emphasised his views on the need for an Australian military build-up.
32
 
 
Likewise, the journalists did not mention that on the same day as Curtin’s filmed speech, the 
Australian troops had faced a disastrous defeat in Java. The Australian divisions had lacked 
weapons in their ships and the unarmed men quickly surrendered to Japanese forces in Java.
33
 
Curtin received very few hospital visitors as he remained in the patients’ ward during the 
bombing of Darwin two days later. He released a brief media statement from his hospital bed 
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about the bombing on 19 February 1942.
34
 Reporters cooperated to emphasise his language of 
enemy threats to the nation. The newspaper references to enemy attacks significantly 
outweighed the defence terms in the press.
35
 The event was portrayed as “Australia’s greatest 
hour” that could be repeated at “many ports in our Northern regions”.36 Whereas Curtin had 
mentioned “enemy” only once in his media release, the term appeared 18 times in the related 
Canberra Times stories.
37
 As the journalists contributed to visualising an enemy deviance 
from Australian democratic ideals, they repeated Curtin’s appeal to “the gallantry that is 
traditional in the people of our stock” to galvanise public support for fighting in the South-
West Pacific battles.
38
 About three months later, the press repeated his radio warning that 
“[t]he invasion is a menace capable hourly of becoming an actuality”.39 Of the selected radio 
scripts, this study found that Curtin aimed his Pacific war messages to Australian audiences 
with a tenth-grade reading level. Whereas his broadcast words were generally at a higher 
level than the ideal score, his messages were still suited to a lower secondary school 
standard.
40
 The news media gave authority and preference to his version of war events, 
neglecting the alternate Allied leaders’ views that the Australian mainland was not in 
immediate danger of an invasion.
41
 
 
A week after the Darwin bombing, the Burma dispute became an opportunity for the news 
editors and journalists to delve beyond staged scenes and media releases. Joseph Alexander 
recalled that Curtin showed a great pile of Churchill’s secret cables to the journalists at a 
private news conference. Curtin also confided that he had defied Churchill’s orders to send 
some Australian troops to the Burma battles.
42
 These troops were from the Sixth and Seventh 
Divisions that had been fighting in the Middle East. Since the divisions lacked weapons in 
their ships, the Australian government did not want to repeat the disaster of Java.
43
 At his 
news conference, Curtin selectively represented the other Allied leaders’ private messages to 
gain the journalists’ support for turning back the troops. His press secretary, Don Rodgers, 
told the press gallery that Churchill had sent a “black mailing” message that threatened to 
withhold Allied support for Australia. Curtin also said that Roosevelt’s secret cable was 
“encouraging”.44 In fact, the US President had sent a more nuanced message to Curtin by 
stating, “I cannot wholly agree as to [the] immediate need of first returning [the] division in 
Australia”. Even so, Roosevelt had concluded in his cable, “[u]nder any circumstances you 
can depend upon our fullest support.” 45 Later Alexander remarked that:  
7 
 
… although [the journalists]were staggered at the idea of Curtin opposing the will of a 
man like Churchill at a time like this, we all felt, I think, proud of him, because he 
was determined to put Australia first.
46
 
As Curtin selectively shared the war cables to create the appearance of seemingly two-way 
conversations with journalists, he generated news messages of him as a trustworthy leader 
who was capable of helping to bring about an Australian war victory.
47
 
 
The private conversations also encouraged the journalists to view themselves as Curtin’s 
confidants. After the cable dispute, he told several journalists of his sleepless nights as he 
worried over the troops’ safety during the journey home to Australia.48 For instance, Curtin 
talked with the Sydney Sun newspaper’s Alan Reid about his nightmares when they were 
playing cards on a train. Reid recalled that he tried to comfort Curtin, but “periodically you’d 
see him wipe the sweat from his forehead.”49 Curtin also met the Sun News-Pictorial 
correspondent Harold Cox during a late summer evening’s walk in Canberra. Curtin 
exclaimed, “Harold! What would you do if you knew the troops’ equipment was on another 
convoy two days behind them?” The next night, Curtin met Harold Cox by coincidence 
again. The reporter remarked that Curtin looked a lot better now. Curtin replied, “Yes, I feel a 
lot better, too. They’re coming home”.50 The seemingly unguarded exchanges elicited 
journalists’ sympathy for Curtin and they self-censored the news of the Sixth and Seventh 
Divisions’ risky voyage back to Australia.51 
 
After the divisions’ safe return in early March 1942,Curtin agreed to journalists’ calls to ease 
the censorship rules to tell a positive story of Australian heroism in war.
52
 The press 
secretary, Don Rodgers, helped to generate credible messages of Curtin’s insistence on 
bringing back the troops for Australian defence. The favourable news coverage benefited 
Curtin because the servicemen arrived in his federal electorate of Fremantle, Western 
Australia a year before the national elections. Rodgers recalled that publicising the story “was 
a very smart move and I should think it had a big effect on the vote in the 1943 elections”.53 
An Australian Cinesound Review newsreel promoted the troops as a “famous fighting unit” 
in the Middle East that had experienced “hardships, grim fighting [and] high adventure”. The 
film also conveyed some muted criticism of the Western Australian government for the 
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lackluster welcome ceremony during the troops’ arrival. Accompanied by emotional images 
of the soldiers reuniting with their families, the narrator explained to the cinema audiences:  
There’s a great big welcome on the mat for these boys and the army of cobbers that 
came with them. And if official welcome arrangements were not all that they might 
have been, it wasn’t the public’s fault. There’s nothing more that John Public and his 
wife want more than a chance to show appreciation of these diggers, the real thing in 
fighting men.
54
 
Outside of Australia, the media event remained contentious because Curtin had resisted the 
other Allies’ demands to send the troops to Burma, which was defeated on 26 May 1942.55 
International film distributors appeared to have filed, but not released, the Australian 
Cinesound Review special.
56
 Masking the controversy, Australian news teams did not blame 
Curtin for the lack of an official reception to greet the returning servicemen.
57
 As he 
associated his prime ministership with the emotional stories of the troops’ courageous battles, 
he appeared a successful war leader.  
 
Unexpectedly, the relaxation of the censorship rules allowed for more news debates on 
Australia’s wartime role. Curtin appeared to encourage and participate in the media 
discussions in the lead-up to the 1943 federal election. Australian journalists began reporting 
on the American press criticisms about the Burma battles. The US General Joseph W. 
Stilwell had partly blamed Australia for the Burma defeat and his media statements were 
widely circulated in the news.
58
 Stilwell had told the New York Times: 
I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma. I think we ought to find 
out what caused it, go back and retake it.
59
  
Moreover, the Australian news owner, Sir Keith Murdoch, argued that the Australian troops 
might have prevented such a humiliating blow to the Allies’ military pride in Burma.60 News 
editors also published readers’ letters and editorials that sided with Curtin. During the 
election campaign, Curtin rebuked “arm chair critics” but still cultivated the appearance of 
frank and open talks in his news conferences.
61
 For example, the Australian United Press 
journalist, F.T. Smith, recalled Curtin’s “amazing outburst” over one of Murdoch’s editorials 
that portrayed the government as giving only half-hearted support to the Allied forces. Curtin 
asserted, “The basis of it was all wrong … it is no good for public morale”. Also he confided 
9 
 
to the reporters that he did not trust Murdoch.
62
 The Herald’s Joseph Alexander recalled his 
embarrassment about some of Murdoch’s editorials:  
“These long, boldly featured articles in ‘The Herald’ made a painful impression on 
me, because the country was at war and in grave danger, and certainly there was no 
one else who could conceivably be considered as taking Curtin’s place.”63 
Curtin used persuasive rhetoric to influence a media campaign that associated his re-election 
with the need to protect Australia. Most newspaper editors helped him to win a landslide 
victory in the 1943 election.
64
 
 
As the Allies gained the military advantage, Curtin agreed to some journalists’ calls for more 
information about Australia’s role in the South-West Pacific battles. He began using his news 
briefings to counteract the global media tendency to overlook Australia’s military 
contributions to the Pacific fighting in 1944.
65
 As Curtin attempted to smooth over the 
tensions with Churchill, he wrote that they should work together to limit the opportunities for 
some American military generals to claim they won the Pacific war “relatively unaided”.66 
When Curtin was absent from the parliament due to his illness, the Federal Opposition and 
newspaper owners objected to the “inadequacy” of General MacArthur’s US-oriented 
communiqués in early January 1945.
67
 MacArthur’s well-resourced publicity headquarters in 
Brisbane released the daily media statements to emphasise the US troops’ success.68 The 
general had already complained privately to Curtin that many news editors were neglecting to 
publicise his communiqués.
69
 For example, Brisbane’s Courier-Mail editor Theodor Bray 
recalled “a degree of exaggeration” in the communiqués that the newsroom received each 
morning.
70
 Once Curtin had resumed his media briefings on 22 January 1945, he announced a 
new communication method for the Australian army’s public relations unit to give 
“supplementary information” about the nation’s troops, in consultation with MacArthur. The 
press campaign succeeded in helping to establish more background briefings on Australia’s 
involvement in the war.
71
  
 
An hour after Bray had received one of MacArthur’s communiqués, an Australian 
government official visited the editor’s Brisbane office to give a secret briefing. MacArthur 
still required Bray to publish his media statement verbatim, but the editor would use the 
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Australian off-the-record talk to decide whether the communiqué deserved a prominent space 
in the next day’s newspaper. Bray explained, “if there was a very high degree of 
exaggeration, it was treated more quietly.”72 Journalists cooperated with Curtin by 
developing eye-witness reporting from battle scenes to magnify the Australian combatants’ 
roles.
73
 Whereas the media colluded with Curtin’s political rhetoric to emphasise the 
significance of the nation’s war contributions, some historians provided a more nuanced 
assessment of the “tenuous relevance” of Australia’s involvement in the final South-West 
Pacific battles.
74
 Curtin retained the news correspondents’ support and they overlooked his 
growing health problems until he died from a heart condition on 5 July 1945, several months 
before the Pacific war’s end.75 
 
Conclusion 
Recruiting news correspondents as allies in influencing public opinion, Curtin initiated 
relatively new journalistic techniques to legitimise the prime minister’s use of off-the-record 
talks and information leaks about war secrets. He used these techniques to win Australian 
journalists’ support for his leadership and his selective views of the war. Curtin developed 
media symbolism, rhetoric and relatable stories of enemy attacks, national peril and 
Australian war heroism. News teams developed the semblance of eye-witness reporting, 
combining emotive imagery and purportedly objective language to portray his interpretations 
as authentic versions of the war events. Masking Allied tensions, the correspondents helped 
to visualise deviance in the form of Axis enemies threatening Australian democracy, 
particularly during the height of the South-West Pacific conflicts. Unexpectedly, Curtin’s 
sharing of information led the journalists to push for more press freedom at times when a 
national crisis seemed to have been averted.  
 
Due to Curtin’s journalism background, he appeared to overturn the censorship restrictions 
once he had orchestrated the subsequent news coverage of the contentious information to his 
political advantage. As he controlled the delivery of war news, he was able to manage his 
talks with journalists to show that he shared their values, concerns and aspirations. Since he 
indicated his agreement with the journalists about a US bias in the war reporting, he created 
more background government briefings that encouraged them to replicate his views of 
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Australia’s role in the battles. This analysis of Curtin’s tactics indicates the value of 
developing close government-media relations to inform war news reports. His seemingly 
open talks provided the journalists with more glimpses and limited views of national 
decision-making and secret foreign policies. As the immediate war crises receded, news 
editors and correspondents developed a slightly more assertive reporting style as they 
demanded comprehensive information on Australia’s involvement in the South-West Pacific 
fighting. Curtin unintentionally created more opportunities for journalists to explore multiple, 
conflicting interpretations of that war zone, although they mainly represented his statements 
as authoritative in the news. Moreover, this study of Curtin’s interactions with the reporters 
indicated a need for more independent, investigative journalism that would delve beyond the 
views of a popular, democratic leader. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Joseph A. Alexander, interviewed by Mel Pratt, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library [hereafter 
JCPML], Bentley, JCPML 00551, 2 March 1971, transcript np. 
2
 Alexander interview; Clem Lloyd and Richard Hall (eds), Backroom Briefings: John Curtin’s war, 
National Library of Australia [hereafter NLA], Canberra, 1997; Donald Kilgour Rodgers, interviewed 
by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00497, 29 April 1971, transcript np. 
3
 Don Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Biography, Australian National University Press, 
Canberra, 1977. 
4
 Alexander interview. 
5
 Australian Department of Defence, “Censorship of Outward Press Copy,” National Archives of 
Australia [hereafter NAA], SP109/3, 315/16, 1942, p. 29; R.J.F Boyer to Williams, NAA, SP109/3, 
315/16, 10 July 1941, p. 100; Harold Cox, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 01060/1, 6 April 1973, 
transcript np. 
6
 Lloyd Ross, John Curtin: A Biography, Macmillan Publishing Company, South Melbourne, 1977. 
7
 Caryn Coatney, “Curtin is Doing a Splendid Job’: How a Wartime Labour Prime Minister Won 
Press Support”, in Bobbie Oliver (ed.) Labour History in the New Century, Black Swan Press, Perth, 
2009, pp. 91-101; C.J. Lloyd, Parliament and the Press: The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery 
1901-88, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1988; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom Briefings. 
8
 Coatney, “‘Curtin is Doing a Splendid Job’”; Richard Hall, “Spin Doctor: the fine art of the 
parliamentary press secretary”, National Library of Australia News, February 1998, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 
3-6. 
9
 Sally Young, “A Century of Political Communication in Australia, 1901-2001,” Journal of 
Australian Studies, vol. 78, 2003, pp. 97-110. 
10
 Diego Garzia, ‘The Personalization of Politics in Western Democracies: Causes and Consequences 
on Leader-Follower Relationships,” The Leadership Quarterly, vol. 22, 2011, pp. 697-709; Fred I. 
Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style From FDR To Clinton, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2004; Joshua Meyrowitz, No Sense Of Place: The Impact Of Electronic 
Media On Social Behaviour, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985. 
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11
 Caryn Coatney, “John Curtin’s Forgotten Media Legacy: The Impact of a Wartime Prime Minister 
on News Management Techniques,” Labour History, vol. 105, 2013, pp. 63-78; David Day, “Curtin 
as Hero,” The Sydney Papers, vol. 12, no. 2, 2000, pp. 60-67; David Day, John Curtin: A life, 
HarperCollinsPublishers, Sydney, 1999. 
12
 National Film and Sound Archive, “Australian Prime Ministers”, Acton, 2008; O. Honeyman, “Mr. 
Menzies’s broadcast”, The Sydney Morning Herald, letter, 22 May 1940, p. 6; Barbara Thomson, 
“Mr. Menzies’s broadcast”, Sydney Morning Herald, letter, 20 May 1940, p. 3; “Why Mr. Menzies 
was not broadcast”, The Argus, 12 July 1939, p. 3. 
13
 Thomas Doherty, Pre-Code Hollywood: Sex, Immorality, and Insurrection in American Cinema 
1930-1934, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999; David Michael Ryfe, (2001), “From Media 
Audience to Media Public: A Study of Letters Written in Reaction to FDR’s Fireside Chats,” Media, 
Culture and Society, vol. 23, 2001, pp. 767-781. 
14
 Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society”, 
International Journal of Communication vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 238-266; Castells, “The New Public 
Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance”, The ANNALS of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 616, no. 1, 2008, pp. 78-93; Richard V. 
Ericson, Patricia M. Baranek and Janet B. L. Chan, Visualizing Deviance: A Study of News 
Organizations, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987. 
15
 Ericson, Baranek and Chan, Visualizing Deviance, p. 16; Stephen Brent Mickler, Visualising 
Aboriginality: Image Campaigns and News Routines in the Western Australian Media, PhD thesis, 
Murdoch University, 1996, pp. 20-21. 
16
 Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society;” Castells, “The New 
Public Sphere”. 
17
 Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society”, pp. 241-242. 
18
 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Aristocracy of Culture”, Media, Culture & Society, vol. 2, 1980, pp. 225-
254. 
19
 At The Front: 1939-1945: Australia’s WWII Newsreels, produced by the Australian Government 
Department of Information, Cinesound Productions, Cinesound Review, Department of Information, 
Movietone and U.S. Army Signal Corps, newsreels, JCPML 00441/2, 1939-1945; Compiled Speeches 
of John Curtin, 1941 – 1945, produced by Cinesound Productions & Cinesound Review, newsreels, 
JCPML 00130/1, 1941-1945; John Joseph Curtin 1885-1945, produced by Cinesound Review & 
Movietone News, newsreels, JCPML 00238/1, 1941-1945; Parliament in Session, ScreenSound 
Australia, JCPML acc. no. 00876/4, 1944; Personalities Living at the Federal Capital, produced by 
Movietone News, newsreel, JCMPL 00876/2, 1941; War in Pacific!, produced by Cinesound 
Productions, newsreel, JCPML 01021/1, 1941. 
20
 Arthur Asa Berger, Media analysis techniques, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1982. 
21
 J.A. Alexander, “Papers 1833-1957”, NLA MS 2389, 1941-1945, transcript np; Cox, “Typescript 
Reports”, NLA MS 4554, 1944-1945, transcript np; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom Briefings; Joseph W. 
Stilwell, “The World War II Diaries of Joseph W. Stilwell”, 25 February, 12 March, 27 April, 21 July 
1942, Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/library-and-archives/collections/east-asia/featured-
collections/joseph-stilwell. Also see, Clement Attlee to John Curtin, 22, 23 February 1942, R.G. 
Casey to Curtin, 21, 22 February 1942, Curtin to Attlee, 23 February 1942, Documents on Australian 
Foreign Policy, vol. 5, http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView 
(accessed 29 October 2013). 
22
 Bourdieu, “The Aristocracy of Culture”. 
23
 Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society”, p. 241. 
24
 Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London”, Digest of Decisions and Announcements 
and Important Speeches by the Prime Minister (Right Hon. John Curtin) [hereafter DDA], no. 81, 8 
May 1944, pp. 53-56; Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”, JCPML 00421/2, 26 July 
1943, transcript np; Curtin, “National Broadcast by Prime Minister”, DDA, no. 10, 8 December 1941, 
pp. 19-22; Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”, DDA, no. 22, 14 March 1942, pp. 9-13. 
25
 Trevor Day, Twelve Writing Tips for Administrative Staff, University of Bath, 2008, 
www.bath.ac.uk/learningandteaching/resources/TwelveWritingTipsRevisedTD.pdf (accessed 29 
13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
September 2009); Elvin T. Lim, ‘The Lion and the Lamb: De-mythologising Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Fireside Chats,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, 2003, pp. 437-464. 
26
 The Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 9-10 December 1941, 16 
March 1942, 27 July 1943, 10 May 1944. 
27
 Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Winning the Media Campaign: 
Methodology,” Journalism.org, 2008, http://www.journalism.org/node/13314 (accessed 26 September 
2009); Public Broadcasting Service, The Online NewsHour, 24 June 2009, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june09/obama_06-24.html (accessed 26 September 
2009). 
28
 Attlee to Curtin, 22, 23 February 1942; Casey to Curtin, 21, 22 February 1942; Curtin to Attlee, 23 
February 1942. Also see, Casey to Department of External Affairs, 20 February 1942, Curtin to 
Casey, 22 February 1942, UK Dominions Office to John Curtin, 21 February 1942, Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy, vol. 5, 
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView (accessed 29 October 
2013). 
29
 Alexander interview; Alexander, “Papers”, 28 December 1941, 20, 24 February 1942; Cox 
interview; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom Briefings. 
30
 “Mr. Curtin opens war loan”, Newsreels of Curtin, 1942-1945, produced by British Movietone 
News, newsreel, JCPML 00734/1, 17 February 1942. 
31
 Parliament in Session; Personalities Living at the Federal Capital. 
32
 “Curtin ill,” The Daily News, 18 February 1942, p. 1; “Mr. Curtin in hospital”, The Barrier Miner 
and Goulburn Evening Post, 18 February 1942, p. 3. Also, Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning 
Herald, West Australian, 18 February 1942. 
33
 Australian Department of Defence Co-ordination, “Lieut General Lavarack – Correspondence with 
Prime Minister Concerning Advice to Government in February 1942 on Division of A.I.F. to Burma,” 
NAA, A5954, 266/7, 1943. 
34
 Curtin, “Attack on Darwin”, DDA, no. 19, 19 February 1942, pp. 8-9. 
35
 “Darwin Bombed”, West Australian, 20 February 1942, p. 5; “Heavy Japanese Blows on Darwin”, 
Canberra Times, 20 February 1942, p. 1; “Two Air Raids on Darwin”, Age, 20 February 1942, p. 1; 
“Two Big Air Raids on Darwin”, Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1942, p. 5. 
36
 “Australia Can Take It”, Canberra Times, 20 February 1942, p. 4; “Into the Front Line”, West 
Australian, 20 February 1942, p. 4.  
37
 “Australia Can Take It”, p. 4; Curtin, “Attack on Darwin”, pp. 8-9; “Heavy Japanese Blows on 
Darwin”, p. 1. 
38
 Curtin, “Attack on Darwin”, p. 9; “Darwin Bombed”, p. 5; “Heavy Japanese Blows on Darwin”, p. 
1; “Two Air Raids on Darwin”, p. 1; “Two Big Air Raids on Darwin”, p. 5.  
39
 “Australia’s Hour of Trial”, Canberra Times, 9 May 1942, p. 2; “Invasion Is Hourly Menace To 
Australia”, Canberra Times, 9 May 1942, p. 1; “‘Invasion Is Menace’: Prime Minister Warns Nation”, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1942, p. 8.  
40
 Curtin, “Broadcast by the Prime Minister from London;” Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy 
Statement;” “National Broadcast by Prime Minister;” Curtin, “Radio broadcast to the United States”. 
41
 Casey to Curtin, 21 February 1942. 
42
 Alexander interview; Alexander, “Papers,” 24 February 1942; Casey to Curtin, 22 February 1942. 
43
 Australian Department of Defence Co-ordination, “Lieut General Lavarack – Correspondence with 
Prime Minister”. 
44
 Alexander, “Papers,” 24 February 1942; Casey to Curtin, 22 February 1942. 
45
 Casey to Curtin, 22 February 1942. 
46
 Alexander interview. 
47
 Alexander, “Papers,” 20, 24 February 1942; Casey to Department of External Affairs, 20 February 
1942; Lloyd and Hall, Backroom Briefings. Also, Daily News, Sydney Morning Herald, West 
Australian, 17-18 February 1942. 
48
 Rodgers interview. 
49
 Alan D. Reid, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00501, 4 October 1972, 28 February 1973, 
transcript np. 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
50
 Cox interview. 
51
 Cox interview; Daily News, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 17-18 February 1942. 
52
 Geoff Burgoyne to Curtin, 27 March 1942, JCPML, N/C. 009; Curtin to Burgoyne, 20 April 1942, 
JCPML, N/C. 010. 
53
 Rodgers interview. 
54
 Diggers Return from Overseas, produced by Cinesound Review, newsreel, 1942, 
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/diggers-return-from-overseas-aka-australians-
retur/query/01330500 (accessed 31 October 2013). 
55
 “What Caused It”, New York Times, 26 May 1942, http://query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch 
(accessed Nov. 1, 2013). 
55
 Stilwell, “The World War II Diaries”, 25 February, 12 March, 27 April, 21 July 1942; “What 
Caused It”. 
56
 Diggers Return from Overseas Aka Australians, British Pathé, unscreened newseel, 1942, 
http://www.britishpathe.com/video/diggers-return-from-overseas-aka-australians-
retur/query/01330500 (accessed 11 September 2014). 
57
 Burgoyne to Curtin, 27 March 1942; Diggers Return from Overseas, Cinesound Review. 
58
 Stilwell, “The World War II Diaries,” 25 February, 12 March, 27 April, 21 July 1942. Also see, 
Blunders of Burma Campaign,” Argus, May 27 1942, 3; “Reasons Given: Disasters of Burma,” The 
Mercury (Hobart), May 27, 1942, 1. 
59
 “Stilwell, After ‘a Beating’ in Burma, Would Hit Back”, New York Times, 26 May 1942; “What 
Caused It”. 
60
 Keith Murdoch, “Some Facts Behind Our Overseas Policies”, Camperdown Chronicle, 13 August 
1943, p. 1.  
61
 Alexander, “Papers”, 20 August 1943; Ena Creelman, “Reply To Sir Keith Murdoch”, 
Camperdown Chronicle, 20 August 1943, p. 2; John Dedman, “Minister Replies To Sir Keith 
Murdoch”, The Advertiser, 17 August 1943, p. 4; The Advocate, 5 August 1943; Argus, 5 August 
1943, p. 5; The Cairns Post, 7 August 1943, p. 5; The Courier-Mail, 5 August 1943, p. 3; The 
Morning Bulletin, 6 August, 1943, p. 3; The Townsville Daily Bulletin, 6 August 1943, p. 1. 
62
 F. T. Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, pp. 99-100.  
63
 Alexander interview. 
64
 Curtin, “General Election ALP Policy Statement”; Also, Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning 
Herald, West Australian, 27 July 1943. 
65
 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 3 July 1944, 16-17 February 1945; “Our Role In Pacific Overlooked”, 
Argus, 5 August 1944, p. 3; Smith, cited in Lloyd and Hall, Backroom briefings, p. 208.  
66
 Curtin to Churchill, 12 August 1944, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, vol. 7. 
67
 F.M. Forde, “Allied Offensive–War Communiques”, DDA, no. 93, 23 November 1944, 10 January 
1945, p. 24.  
68
 “Army & Navy High Command – Hero on Ice”, Time, 3 August 1942, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,773343,00.html#ixzz1JZ9001FO (accessed 15 
April 2011). 
69
 “Advisory War Council minutes”, NAA, A5954, 815/1, 9 December 1943, p. 5. 
70
 Theodor Charles Bray, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 00512, 5 March 1971, transcript np.  
71
 “A.I.F. Activities Endorsed: Mr. Curtin Says Hazards Reduced”, Canberra Times, 23 January 1945, 
p. 2; Forde, “Allied Offensive–War Communiques”. 
72
 Bray interview. 
73
 Australian Broadcasting Commission, “Scripts of talks broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting 
Commission (ABC) Brisbane - War Time Recordings 1939 to 1945 - Interview with Lt W N Swan by 
N B Graves on HMAS Westralia”, NAA, BP257/1, 73/2, 14 March 1945, pp. 1-7; Charles Buttrose, 
“Allied Forces Occupy Gona Area”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 December 1942, p. 1; John 
Commins, interviewed by Mel Pratt, JCPML 01092/1, 22-26 May 1971, transcript np. 
74
 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, third 
edition, 2008, p. 190; Peter Stanley, Tarakan: An Australian Tragedy, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 
1997. 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
75
 Cox, “Typescript reports”, 21 August 1944, 19 October 1944, 22 January 1945, 9 February 1945, 5 
March 1945, 19 March 1945, 9 April 1945; “Mr. Curtin’s Health: Longer Rest Likely”, Sydney 
Morning Herald, cited in Scrapbooks compiled by the Prime Minister’s office [hereafter Scrapbooks], 
14 June 1945; Clive Turnbull, “Mr Curtin and the Nation’s Future”, Herald, cited in Scrapbooks, 24 
May 1945. Also, Age, Canberra Times, Sydney Morning Herald, West Australian, 9-10 December 
1941, 16 March 1942, 27 July 1943, 10 May 1944. 
